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THE DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE CONCERNS
IN THE DEBATE OVER EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL:
SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
MARTIN H. MALIN*
The traditional rule that employment contracts that do not ex-
pressly fix a duration are terminable at will by either party has come
under assault in the past three decades. In its purest form, the rule pre-
cluded enforcement in contract of even the clearest express employer
promise of job security unless the employee gave a corresponding prom-
ise not to quit in return. I It also precluded application of traditional tort
claims to the workplace out of fear that such causes of action would
weaken the employer's contractual right to terminate "for good cause,
bad cause or no cause."' 2
In recent years, however, courts, legislatures and commentators
have attacked the at-will rule to the point where an employer's legal right
to discharge at will has been levelled to the status of a legal fiction. In
contract law, courts have redefined the at-will rule from a rule of law to a
rule of construction, opining that an employment contract of indefinite
duration is presumed to be terminable at will but that the employee may
rebut the presumption with evidence of promises of job security. Courts
have also afforded employees contractual job security by implying a cove-
nant of good faith into the employment agreement. In tort, courts have
applied traditional torts such as intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and defamation to further restrict employment termination, even
* Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A. 1973, Michigan State University; J.D. 1976, George Washing-
ton University. I wish to thank my colleagues on the faculty at Chicago-Kent College of Law for
helpful comments when I presented an earlier version of this paper at a faculty roundtable. I wish to
particularly thank my colleague Richard Warner for written comments and Nicholas Clifford for
research assistance. Financial support was provided by the Marshall Ewell Research Fund at Chi-
cago-Kent.
1. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently stated the rule in its purest form:
Our own cases have adhered to this principle, that either party has an absolute right to
terminate the relationship .... Moreover, we have held firmly to this view even where a
contract of employment provides the employee will not be discharged except for good
cause. We have said that where an employer and an employee agree the employee shall not
be discharged without cause, the contract is not enforceable where there is no agreement by
the employee to serve for any specified time.
Griffin v. Erickson, 642 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Ark. 1982).
2. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
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where the employer has a contractual right to discharge at will.3 They
have also developed a new tort of abusive discharge which affords em-
ployees a remedy for at-will terminations which violate public policy.
Legislatures have defined numerous characteristics and activities which
may not form the basis for discharge. Montana has statutorily imposed a
requirement of cause for dismissal in most cases. The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have recommended adoption of a Uniform Wrong-
ful Termination Act. Law reviews are filled with pages of commentary
calling for limiting or abandoning the at-will rule.
The at-will rule, however, refuses to die. Many courts which have
recast the rule as one of contract interpretation have made rebuttal of the
presumption of at-will employment difficult; they often require detailed
evidence of very specific promises of job security and give effect to boiler-
plate disclaimers. Many courts which recognize the tort of abusive dis-
charge have narrowly confined the circumstances where they will
consider dismissal to be contrary to public policy. Courts which have
severely limited their contractual and tort exceptions to the at-will rule
have expressed concern that it not become too easy to override the bene-
fits of the rule. Legislatures, also, continue to breath life into the at-will
rule. Although the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act is four years old,
no other jurisdiction has followed its lead. Furthermore, a substantial
minority of commentators have risen to the defense of the at-will rule in
the scholarly literature.
Numerous arguments have been put forth for and against the rule of
at-will employment termination. My purpose in this Essay is to dissect
some of the most forceful arguments to determine whether they appeal to
considerations of corrective or distributive justice. For this purpose, I
adopt Aristotle's distinctions between corrective and distributive justice
as set forth in Book V of his Nichomachean Ethics. I do not regard this
as a purely academic exercise. I suggest that it will better enable us to
evaluate the merits of the arguments. Recognizing that certain argu-
ments in the debate over at-will employment appeal to considerations of
distributive justice will enable us to determine and critically evaluate the
criteria the arguer is relying on for distributing goods within society.
Recognizing that other arguments appeal to concerns of corrective jus-
tice will enable us to determine and critically evaluate the basis for the
claim that under certain circumstances employment termination is mor-
ally wrong.
3. See, e.g., Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988); Agis v. Howard John-
son Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).
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I. DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive and corrective justice share a goal of equality, which is
the mean between excess and too little. A person is just who treats all
others equally. The equality of distributive justice, however, is markedly
different from the equality of corrective justice. Distributive justice re-
quires proportional equality whereby each individual has a share in the
distribution of goods in society in proportion to that individual's merit.
Thus, distributive justice requires the distribution of goods among indi-
viduals in accordance with some mediated criteria of merit. Each indi-
vidual with the same merit receives the same share and all individuals'
shares are determined by the same criteria of merit. Corrective justice, in
contrast, is based on what Aristotle termed an arithmetic equality, in
which all individuals are treated as absolutely equal regardless of merit.
Corrective justice provides for the rectification of wrongs committed by
one individual that cause harm to another. Each individual who is
harmed by a moral wrong committed by another has a right to rectifica-
tion, regardless of distributive merit.
Some have argued that corrective justice serves only to correct
moral wrongs which upset an otherwise just distribution.4 This does not
appear to be Aristotle's position. He writes:
It makes no difference whether a decent man has defrauded a bad man
or vice versa, or whether it was a decent or a bad man who committed
adultery. The only difference the law considers is that brought about
by the damage: it treats the parties as equals and asks only whether one
has done and the other has suffered wrong and whether one has done
and the other has suffered damage.5
Our legal system also does not view the function of corrective justice
as the restoration of a just distribution. One who has obtained a good
unjustly may still have a claim in corrective justice against another who
damages that good unjustly. For example, a thief has a claim for re-
plevin against a subsequent thief.6 Generally, a claim based in distribu-
tive justice does not provide a defense to a claim for conversion or
trespass. 7 The key purpose of corrective justice is to redress damage
caused by a moral wrong in a particular transaction, and all individuals
have an absolutely equal claim to such redress, regardless of the claim-
ant's qualifications for a distributive share and whether the claimant's
holdings are in proportion to her qualifications.
4. James W. Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (1976).
5. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-21 (M. Ostwald trans., 1962).
6. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892).
7. See, e.g., London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, 2 All E.R. 175 (C.A. 1971).
1992]
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Thus, the key question in an appeal to corrective justice is to identify
the transactional moral wrong which forms the basis for the claim.
Claims of corrective justice are bi-polar and therefore particularly well-
suited to judicial resolution. In contrast, the key question in an appeal to
distributive justice is to identify the criteria of merit which form the bases
for the distribution. The criteria must mediate the distribution among
multiple groups of individuals. Consequently, courts, which operate
through bi-polar litigation, often are not well-suited to resolve such
claims. Courts may, however, be capable of resolving claims based in
distributive justice when they involve distributions between two groups
of individuals and each party typifies one of those groups.
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Hilda v. St. Peter, 8 recog-
nizing an implied warranty of habitability in a residential lease, illus-
trates how elements of corrective and distributive justice may be present
in a particular legal controversy. The court rejected the traditional view
of a lease as a conveyance of real property under which the landlord's
only obligation, absent express covenants to the contrary, was to deliver
possession. Under the traditional view, as long as the tenant remained in
possession, the tenant was obligated to pay rent and the landlord in-
curred no liability to the tenant regardless of the conditions of the
premises.
The court reasoned that the traditional view had to give way to
changes in the circumstances of residential tenants and landlords. The
traditional approach arose in an agrarian society in which the tenant pri-
marily sought arable land. In contrast, the residential tenant in modern
urban society seeks safe, sanitary and comfortable housing. Further-
more, in the court's view, changes in the characteristics of modern ten-
ants required abandoning the traditional view of a lease. Unlike the
agrarian tenant, the urban tenant is not likely to have the ability to main-
tain and repair the premises, and, in light of urban housing shortages, is
unable to bargain for an express promise by the landlord to undertake
such obligations even though the landlord has superior knowledge and
financial resources to do so. Consequently, the court held that every resi-
dential lease contains, as a matter of law, a non-waivable covenant of
habitability.
The implied warranty of habitability as developed in Hilda is based
in considerations of corrective and distributive justice. The court's con-
cern with changes in the empirical reality of residential tenancies sug-
gests that the implied covenant is based in corrective justice. That is,
8. 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984).
[Vol. 68:117
JUSTICE AND EMPLOYMENT AT- WILL
because the modem residential tenancy is intended to provide a residence
in which to live, rather than land to till, the reasonable expectations of
the parties are that the dwelling is habitable and will be maintained in
that condition. Thus, a landlord who breaches the warranty transfers to
the tenant less than what the tenant purchased. The resulting transac-
tional inequality must be remedied regardless of the relative merits of the
particular landlord and tenant.
The warranty, however, is not waivable. Thus, the warranty is im-
plied without regard for the real expectations of particular parties. It is
implied because tenants need habitable housing and lack the ability to
repair uninhabitable housing, whereas landlords have such ability. In
other words, relying on the criteria of need and ability, the court deter-
mined that it is distributively just to impose on all landlords of residential
property a duty to maintain their property in habitable condition.
It might be argued that the court's concerns with distributive crite-
ria was not proper because the court had only one particular landlord
and one particular tenant before it. The court's use of distributive crite-
ria, however, is based on a generalized view of the relative merits of land-
lords and tenants with respect to a very base level standard-habitable,
not luxurious, housing. At this base level, the court presumed that all
tenants' needs were equal, as they are derived from the very purpose for
which a modern tenant rents residential property. The court also treated
all landlords' abilities to meet this base level standard as equally superior
to their tenants' because, by virtue of being in the business of renting
residential property, they hold themselves out as having the ability to
maintain the property in habitable condition. Thus, the court regarded
the immediate parties and their claims as representative of the classes
that were subject to the court's redistribution.9
9. It has been argued that implied covenants of habitability actually reduce the supply of
housing to low income tenants. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 445-
47 (3d ed. 1986). Assuming that such arguments are correct, it remains appropriate for a court to
resolve the distributive justice claims to warranties of habitability. The tenant remains representa-
tive of a class of all tenants, albeit making a choice on behalf of that class between a greater supply of
uninhabitable housing and a smaller supply of habitable housing.
It might still be argued that the legislature, rather than the court, is in a better position to make
these distributive judgments. Because the court has to treat the parties as representative of their
general classes, ie landlords and tenants, the court is unable to allow for differences in merit among
members of those classes. For example, wealthy tenants may not need the implied warranty because
they have the financial ability to provide for maintenance and repairs independent of the landlord.
Small landlords may not have the same level of ability to provide for repairs than large landlords.
The court's redistribution from landlords to tenants based on its view of their relative merit,
however, does not preclude the legislature from further refining the distribution through means that
are not available to courts. For example, the legislature could, if it concluded that such an action
was merited, tax residential leases above a certain rental and use the proceeds to subsidize poorer
landlords who need the subsidy to maintain their properties in habitable condition.
19921
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II. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DEBATE
Dissecting the distributive and corrective justice elements in the em-
ployment at-will debate will enable us not only to evaluate the argu-
ments, but also to determine whether the concerns are more appropriate
for judicial or legislative resolution. The at-will rule permits termination
for good cause, bad cause, or no cause. No one disputes the right to
terminate for good cause. The controversy focuses on curtailing the abil-
ity to terminate for bad cause or no cause.
A. Termination for Bad Cause
Most of the erosion of the at-will rule has focused on the employer's
ability to terminate for bad cause. The key controversy focuses on how
to define bad cause. The first and most specific limitations on employer
ability to fire for bad cause have come from the legislature. Statutes de-
fine employee conduct or characteristics that, for reasons of social utility,
the legislature has decided to protect from the employer's power to dis-
charge. There are three types of statutes: labor relations and equal em-
ployment opportunity (EEO) statutes which protect certain employee
characteristics, anti-retaliation statutes which protect employees who ex-
ercise rights guaranteed by the statutes, and whistleblower protection
statutes which protect employees who assist in statutory enforcement.
B. Statutes Protecting Employee Characteristics
The first major statute protecting employee characteristics was the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits discharge or
other discrimination against employees to discourage membership in a
labor organization.10 This limitation of the employer's ability to termi-
nate for bad cause is an intricate part of an overall statutory scheme
designed to distribute power and wealth in the workplace. Two of the
NLRA's primary purposes were to promote industrial democracy and to
improve employee compensation and working conditions. It achieved
the former by redistributing power in the workplace from unilateral em-
ployer decision-making to negotiation with the employees through their
collective representative. It sought to achieve the latter by granting the
union selected by a majority of the employees exclusive authority to rep-
resent all employees, thereby eliminating the competition among employ-
ees that drives wages and working conditions down.
10. The NLRA originally prohibited discrimination to discourage union membership. In 1947,
the Taft-Hartley Act amended the statute to add a prohibition against discrimination to encourage
union membership.
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The EEO laws provide the other major source of statutory protec-
tion of employee characteristics. All such statutes are modeled on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 At first glance, Title VII would
appear to be a declaration that employment decision-making based on
race 12 is morally wrong. Consequently, whenever an employer under-
takes an adverse employment action because of an individual's race, a
transactional inequality arises which must be redressed as a matter of
corrective justice.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that much of Title VII is distribu-
tive in nature, going beyond correcting the transactional inequalities that
result from deliberately racist employment decisions. For example, Title
VII prohibits an employer from segregating its sales force racially even
though the employer might be able to prove that customers are more
likely to buy from members of their own races. The statute also prohibits
the use of neutral criteria if the criteria have an adverse impact on mem-
bers of a racial minority and are not justified by a business necessity.
Thus, the statute is not merely a command to avoid racial bigotry; rather,
it imposes an affirmative obligation to consider racial impact, direct or
derivative, when an employer distributes goods in the workplace.
C. Anti-retaliation Statutes
Many employment statutes prohibit retaliation against employees
who exercise statutory rights. These anti-retaliation provisions are an
intricate part of the statutory schemes which confer those rights. The
rights themselves are based in considerations of distributive justice, and
the rights would not exist without the anti-retaliation provisions.
For example, Section 7 of the NLRA grants to employees the right
to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. This right
has its roots in distributive justice, i.e. the NLRA's goal of redistributing
decision-making power and wealth in the workplace. The right, how-
ever, has no meaning that is independent of the employer's duty under
Section 8(a)(1) to not interfere, restrain or coerce employee exercise of
that right. Thus, protection against discharge in retaliation for the exer-
cise of Section 7 rights is clearly part of the distributive scheme of the
11. For a discussion of the extent to which Title VII has served as a model, see Howard C.
Eglit, Title VII: A Statute of Wide-Ranging Influence, in TITLE VII AT 25, at 10-12 (Martin H.
Malin ed., 1989).
12. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, and religion, but
the primary concern of Congress was protecting African-Americans from racial discrimination.
Therefore, in the text, I will discuss Title VII in the context of racial discrimination. The same
points, however, apply with equal force to the other protected classes.
19921
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NLRA. Indeed, a key issue in many Section 8(a)(1) discharge cases is
whether the employee's conduct merited Section 7 protection.' 3
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits
employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employ-
ees for the purpose of interfering with employee rights under the statute
or under an employee benefit plan established pursuant to the statute. At
first glance, this anti-retaliation provision would appear to be designed to
correct transactional inequalities resulting from employer attempts to
give employees less compensation than agreed to by the parties. For ex-
ample, if the parties agreed that an employee would be eligible to partici-
pate in the employer's pension plan after one year of service and would
vest after five years of service, the employer would receive the employee's
services for less than it bargained for if it were allowed to terminate the
employee after four years and eleven months to prevent her from vesting.
The corrective nature of ERISA's anti-retaliation provision fades,
however, when we consider the source of the employee's retirement com-
pensation. That compensation did not result from the parties' negotia-
tions; rather, it resulted from the distributive aspects of the statute itself.
ERISA represents a determination that a portion of the common wealth
shall be channeled toward retirement income. This is accomplished by
giving "qualified" retirement plans very favorable treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code. Furthermore, the criteria which may be used to
distribute retirement wealth are tightly regulated to ensure a just distri-
bution to all employees based on length of service. As a result, ERISA
imposes minimum participation and vesting standards and prohibits dis-
crimination in contribution and benefit formulas which would favor
highly compensated employees. Thus, the employee who was able to
participate in the retirement plan after one year of service did so because
the statute prohibits employers from delaying participation for any em-
ployee for longer than one year of service. Similarly, the statute requires
that employees vest after five years of service. These requirements are
part of the distributive scheme enacted in ERISA. The prohibition on
retaliation is also an intricate part of that scheme. The employee is pro-
tected from retaliation, not out of respect for her equal moral worth in
the transaction with her employer, but because of her claim to pension
benefits based on merit as detailed in the statute.
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
[Vol. 68:117
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D. Whistleblower Protection Statutes
Many statutes protect employees against discharge or other retalia-
tion for reporting, or, in some cases, otherwise opposing, employer statu-
tory violations. I contend that these whistleblower protections are
intricately tied to the nature of the statutory duty that the employee is
helping to enforce. If the statutory duty's source is distributive, the stat-
utory protection for the whistleblowing employee is also distributive. If
the statutory duty's source is corrective, the whistleblower's protection is
also corrective.
It could be argued that regardless of the distributive or corrective
nature of the statutory duty, we engage in an act of corrective justice by
redressing an employer's retaliation against an employee for requiring
the employer to live up to that duty. Neither employer nor employee are
above the law. Consequently, redressing retaliatory dismissals could be
based on respect for the equal moral worth of the parties to the employ-
ment transaction.
Although it is possible to develop a corrective justice theory of
whistleblower protection, the actual whistleblower protective statutes do
not follow such a theory. They do not purport to respect the equal moral
worth of employer and employee by providing that neither is above the
law in the. employment transaction. Rather, they distribute power in the
workplace as tied to job security in accordance with a specific mediated
criterion, iLe., the employee's social utility in statutory enforcement.
Statutes which prohibit retaliation against employees who oppose or
report statutory violations by their employers do so because of a need to
rely on employees as a key element in enforcement. For example, the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prohibits discharging or otherwise
discriminating against an employee for filing an FLSA complaint, insti-
tuting or causing to be instituted an FLSA proceeding, or testifying in an
FLSA proceeding.' 4 The Supreme Court has emphasized congressional
reliance on employees as tools of statutory enforcement in interpreting
the reach of the FLSA's whistleblower protection:
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to se-
cure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing de-
tailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to
rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking
to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective en-
forcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to ap-
proach officials with their grievances. 5
14. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1992).
15. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
1992)
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Similar reliance is found in the whistleblower protection provisions in
statutes that do not regulate the workplace. A series of federal environ-
mental statutes protect employee whistleblowers. These statutes also
clearly protect employees because of their utility in enforcement. The
first such protection appeared in the 1972 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. Its purpose was to provide that "employ-
ees and union officials could help assure that employers do not contribute
to the degradation of our environment."1 6 Reliance on employees to help
enforce environmental laws was recognized as common practice, and
whistleblower protection was considered to be "standard employee pro-
tection" by 1976.17
Although employee whistleblower protection may be regarded as
standard in environmental legislation, it remains the exception in legisla-
tion in general. The legislative decision to protect employees against re-
taliatory dismissal generally is based on a legislative determination of the
employees' utility in the enforcement scheme. Indeed, that level of utility
will also determine the scope of employee protection. For example, false
and malicious charges are protected against retaliation under Title VII,18
but not under the NLRA. 19
Even general whistleblower protection laws are not rooted in correc-
tive justice. The first such statute was enacted in Michigan. In a prior
article, I have shown how the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act
protects employees because they are a significant source of law enforce-
ment assistance. 20 The Act does not concern itself with whether the
whistleblower resorted to reasonably available internal channels to cor-
rect the violation, with the employee's motive in blowing the whistle, or
with whether the employee made any inquiries into the accuracy of her
claim prior to blowing the whistle. Such concerns would be relevant in
deciding whether the discharge of a whistleblower in any particular case
was morally wrong. The statute, however, is not concerned with transac-
tional moral wrongs. Instead, it distributes power in the workplace
based on the social utility of protecting the employee from the employer's
power to fire.
Erosion of the employer's traditional power to fire for bad cause has
16. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3748.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,
6245.
18. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. NLRB v. Brake Parts Co., 447 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1971); Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. NLRB,
331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964).
20. Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 277, 304-07 (1984).
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not been confined to the legislative branch of government. Courts in a
majority of jurisdictions have recognized a tort cause of action for retali-
atory discharge. Under this emerging tort, a plaintiff may recover when
her discharge violates public policy. The tort's development has followed
the statutory pattern. Courts discern employee conduct that they find
worthy of protection for reasons of social utility and prohibit employers
from discharging in retaliation against the exercise of such conduct.
Courts, however, are sharply divided over what employee conduct
should be protected. Some jurisdictions protect only those employees
who are fired for exercising statutory rights or for refusing to breach
statutory duties. Even within this group, there is division concerning
whether all statutory rights should be protected. For example, in Camp-
bell v. Ford Industries, Inc. ,21 the Oregon Supreme Court held that an
employee who was also a shareholder in the employer had no cause of
action to redress his discharge which allegedly retaliated against his exer-
cise of a statutory right to inspect the company's books and records. The
court reasoned that the statute protected shareholders' private and pro-
prietary rights and did not serve a sufficiently public purpose to provide a
basis for a tort claim. The Virginia Supreme Court has rejected this
view, holding that an employee discharged allegedly for refusing to vote
his stock in accordance with the wishes of management states a claim for
retaliatory discharge. 22
A growing number of jurisdictions require a statutory basis for the
public policy but do not strictly limit employee protection to their exer-
cise of statutory rights or compliance with statutory duties. These states
expand the tort to employees discharged for attempting to prevent their
employers from violating statutes or for reporting violations to appropri-
ate authorities. 23
A few jurisdictions have gone beyond statutory declarations of pub-
lic policy in finding discharges to be actionable. These courts often
sweep broadly in their definitions of public policy, only to retreat in sub-
sequent cases. For example, in Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co.,24 the Illinois Supreme Court declared that a public policy favoring
citizen crime fighters protected an employee allegedly fired for reporting
to police illegal activity of a coworker. The same court, however, has
21. 546 P.2d 141 (Or. 1976).
22. Bowman v. State Bank, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).
23. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Boyle v. Vista
Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984);
McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
24. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
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refused to protect employees allegedly fired for filing health insurance
claims 25 or for protesting employer violations of a municipal ordinance.26
The Illinois Supreme Court's apparent retreat from Palmateer led that
state's intermediate appellate court to characterize the case as setting
"the outer limits for at will employees" and to deny a cause of action to
an employee allegedly fired for reporting suspected criminal activity of
coworkers to the employer, rather than to law enforcement authorities. 27
Thus, the tort of retaliatory discharge appears to be dependent upon
an ad hoc case-by-case and jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis of the so-
cial utility of the employee's conduct. The Arizona Supreme Court can-
didly admitted as much in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,28
in holding actionable the discharge of an employee for refusing to
"moon" others at a private camping party: "[W]e will look to the pro-
nouncements of our founders, our legislature, and our courts to discern
the public policy of this state. All such pronouncements, however, will
not provide the basis for a claim of wrongful discharge. Only those
which have a singularly public purpose will have such force."'29
This ad hoc evaluation of the social utility of employee conduct has
produced results that to a reasonable employer or employee must appear
to be incomprehensible anomalies. For example, an Illinois employee is
protected for protesting employer violations of state or federal safety
statutes, but not for protesting employer violations of a municipal safety
ordinance. 30 An Illinois employee is protected for filing a workers' com-
pensation claim, but not for filing a health insurance claim.3' A Penn-
sylvania employee is protected for investigating illegal self-dealing by his
employer's president, but not for having an unsafe product removed from
the market.3 2 A Michigan employee is protected for refusing to make
misrepresentations to the government, but not for trying to prevent mis-
representations by others.33
The hopelessly inconsistent results of judicial attempts to define the
25. Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1985).
26. Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Serv., Inc., 488 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1986).
27. Zaniecki v. P.A. Bergner & Co., 493 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
28. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
29. Id. at 1034.
30. Compare Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1122 (1986) with Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Serv., Inc., 488 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1986).
31. Compare Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978) with Price v. Carmack Dat-
sun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1985).
32. Compare Klayes v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D.Pa. 1984) with Geary v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
33. Compare Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
with Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982).
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tort of retaliatory discharge lend credence to the minority of jurisdictions
that have refused to recognize any common law claims for retaliatory
discharge. These jurisdictions invariably reason that the determination
of when a public policy should be backed by a prohibition on employee
dismissal is an issue that is best left to the legislature. 34 Recognizing that
the tort of retaliatory discharge has its roots in judicial distribution of
power in the workplace based on the social utility of employee conduct
enables us to evaluate the position of the minority of jurisdictions that it
is inappropriate for courts to adjudicate these distributive claims.
I have previously observed that because claims based in distributive
justice tend to involve multiple parties, courts, operating through bi-po-
lar litigation, often will not be equipped to resolve them. I have also
suggested, however, that a court may appropriately resolve a distributive
claim where the distribution is between two classes and each party repre-
sents the interests of the class to which she belongs. Thus, it was appro-
priate for the court in Hilda to adjudicate the distributive justice claims
of tenants to habitable housing because the claim involved a distribution
between tenants and landlords and each party represented the relevant
class interests.
At first glance it might appear that the distributive justice claims in
retaliatory discharge tort actions are comparable to the distributive jus-
tice claims in warranty of habitability cases. In retaliatory discharge
cases, the court seeks the appropriate distribution of power in the work-
place between two classes: employers and employees. The parties to a
retaliatory discharge action represent their respective classes.
In warranty of habitability cases, however, the criteria on which the
distribution is based are need for and ability to provide habitable hous-
ing. These criteria relate exclusively to characteristics of members of the
two classes. Thus, the claim is truly a bi-polar class claim in which the
parties may adequately represent their classes.
In retaliatory discharge cases, the primary criterion for distributing
power between employers and employees is social utility to society as a
whole. The employee's interest is job security, but that interest is only
incidentally related to the criteria for power distribution. The employee
is forced to base her interest in job security on the collective interests in
the utility of her conduct.
The often unstated second criterion for distributing workplace
34. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club,
Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.
2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
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power in retaliatory discharge claims is employer need in running the
enterprise. As the dissenting justice in Palmateer put it: "The courts
must recognize that the allowance of a tort action for retaliatory dis-
charge is a departure from, and an exception to, the general rule. The
legitimate interest of the employer in guiding the policies and destination
of his operation cannot be ignored. ' 35 Thus, in retaliatory discharge ac-
tions, courts are distributing workplace power in proportion to the em-
ployer's business needs and the social utility of the employee's conduct.
These criteria do not lend themselves to evaluation in bipolar litigation
between employer and employee. For example, the social utility of an
employee's actions in enforcing a statute may only be fully evaluated in
light of the distribution of benefits from that statute and the distribution
of costs of statutory enforcement. Evaluation of the distribution of statu-
tory benefits requires consideration of such factors as whether the statu-
tory rights are proprietary in nature or truly beneficial to the public.
Evaluation of the distribution of enforcement costs requires considera-
tion of such factors as whether employee involvement contributes signifi-
cantly to statutory enforcement or whether the costs of enforcement
should be spread among the beneficiaries of the statute through taxation
to support public enforcement efforts. The legislature is in a far better
position to weigh the criteria and, thereby, determine the proportions
which allocate workplace power.
Thus, the tort of retaliatory discharge has developed from an inap-
propriate judicial adjudication of claims based in distributive justice.
This, however, does not compel the conclusion that tort law has no role
to play in regulating employment termination. Rather, it suggests that to
the extent tort claims arise from employment termination, they should be
rooted in corrective justice, i.e., they should be geared to correct transac-
tional inequalities resulting from moral wrongs.
Such a formulation of the tort was initially advocated by Professor
Lawrence Blades in his seminal 1967 article in the Columbia Law Re-
view. 36 Blades argued that courts should temper the harsh effect of the
at-will rule by recognizing a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge.
Drawing upon traditional principles of tort law, he contended that a dis-
charge should be actionable whenever it is unrelated to the employee's
job. The tort's purpose was to protect the employee's freedom of action
from the employer's power to discharge at will. Eighteen years later,
35. Palamateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (Ill. 1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
36. Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
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Blades succinctly explained the basis for his proposal: "My central thesis
in that Columbia Law Review article was that there should be legally
enforceable limitations on an employer's power to control an employee's
life and freedom as to matters which should be none of an employer's
business." 37
The tort, as formulated by Blades, recognizes an employee's right to
privacy in those aspects of her life that have nothing to do with her job.
This right finds its basis in the reasonable expectations of the parties.
When an employee accepts employment she voluntarily accepts limita-
tions on her freedom of action that are inherent in the job. For example,
she agrees to report for work on time and in a condition that enables her
to perform her duties. She does not, however, consent to limitations on
her freedom that bear no relation to the job. By providing employment,
the employer has not purchased total control over the employee's life.
Thus, when an employer discharges an employee for reasons that are not
related to the job, a transactional inequality arises which must be re-
dressed regardless of the parties' distributive merit.
The tort, as formulated by Blades, is based in corrective justice and
is bipolar in nature. Courts are the most appropriate branch of govern-
ment to resolve such claims. Unfortunately, the courts have largely ig-
nored this formulation of the tort, choosing instead to focus on the social
utility of the employee's conduct. I suggest that courts have misplaced
their analysis in deciding how to regulate employment termination.
E. Discharge for No Cause
Although statutes and tort actions have obliterated much of the em-
ployer's legal ability to discharge for bad cause, most of the ability to
discharge for no cause remains intact. The major assaults on the em-
ployer's ability to discharge without cause have come in the public sec-
tor, where civil service and tenure statutes require cause for dismissal
and in collective bargaining where almost all contracts require cause for
discipline or discharge. In the non-unionized private sector, only Mon-
tana has statutorily required cause for dismissal. In all other jurisdic-
tions, employees seeking protection under a rule requiring cause for
dismissal are at the mercy of the common law of contracts.
Many jurisdictions which have recognized tort claims for retaliatory
discharge have retained the at-will rule in its purest form in their com-
mon law of contracts. Others have retained the at-will rule, but recast it
37. Lawrence Blades, Foreword to W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINA-
TION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1985).
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from a rule of law to a rule of construction. In these jurisdictions, em-
ployment contracts of indefinite duration are presumed to be terminable
at will, but the employee may overcome the presumption with evidence
of promises of job security. The key issue in these jurisdictions is what
type of evidence will suffice to overcome the presumption of at-will
termination.
Some courts have required very little. They have implied promises
of job security from longevity of employment, an employer practice of
dismissing only for cause, and even from the employer's failure to deny
that its policy was to dismiss only for cause.38 Others have required ex-
press specific promises of job security and found the presumption of at-
will termination not to be overcome in situations where the clear, reason-
able expectation of the parties was to the contrary. For example, in
Parker v. United Airlines,39 a 12-year employee was discharged for alleg-
edly stealing employer funds. The Washington Court of Appeals held
that the employee plaintiff was terminable at will, despite the following
evidence: (1) employees were granted regular employment upon comple-
tion of a probationary period; (2) employees were told at an orientation
session that after their probationary periods they would be discharged
only for cause; (3) the employer had an internal grievance procedure
through which the plaintiff had challenged her discharge and which fo-
cused on whether the plaintiff had in fact stolen employer funds; and, (4)
the employer's president had assured employees of fair treatment. The
court interpreted the employee's regular-employee status as merely pro-
viding that her employment was of indefinite duration. It viewed the
grievance procedure as merely implementing company policy to treat all
employees fairly. It concluded that the plaintiff's evidence only estab-
lished her subjective understanding that she would be discharged only for
cause and did not establish a contractual limitation on the employer's
ability to terminate at will.
Some jurisdictions have swept broadly in their treatment of em-
ployer statements, actions, and policies as evidence which may rebut the
presumption of at-will employment, only to retreat from their positions
in subsequent decisions. Michigan provides a prime example.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,4° the Michi-
gan Supreme Court upheld jury verdicts which found that two employees
38. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Frazier v.
Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983); Allegri v. Providence-St. Mar-
garet Health Ctr., 684 P.2d 1031 (Kan. App. 1984).
39. 649 P.2d 181 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
40. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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had contracts that required just cause for termination. One employee
had inquired about job security, was told that he would be with the com-
pany as long as he did his job, and was given a personnel policy manual
which provided that employees who completed their probationary peri-
ods would only be terminated for cause. The second employee negoti-
ated with his employer prior to his hiring and was told that he would not
be discharged if he was doing his job. The court explained its rationale
for enforcing implied contract rights to job security for both employees:
[W]here an employer chooses to establish [personnel] policies and
practices and makes them known to his employees, the employment
relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an or-
derly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of
mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be
treated fairly. No preemployment negotiations need take place and the
parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the
employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies
and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to
create an environment in which the employee believes that, whatever
the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at
any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and
uniformly to each employee. 41
Eleven years later the court retreated from Toussaint. In Rowe v.
Montgomery Ward & Co.94 2 the court held that a commissioned appli-
ance sales representative was terminable at will, even though she was told
by the official who hired her that she would have a job as long her
monthly sales performance equalled or exceeded her salary draw and she
did not engage in serious misconduct. 43 The court held that these ex-
press provisions did not establish that the relationship was terminable
only for cause. It distinguished Toussaint as follows:
41. Id. at 892 (footnote omitted).
42. 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
43. The department manager who hired the plaintiff testified as follows:
"A.... Their main objective, the number one thing was that they must attain their draw of
a hundred and twenty-six dollars a week, and generally; as long as they generated sales and
were honest, why, they had a job at Wards, and that's the way we used to hire our people.
"Q. What did you tell Mary Rowe when you hired her?
"A. That was the prime purpose, to get sales and to attain that roughly $2,000 a week or
more in sales."
In further discussing the conditions of employment, Harryman stated:
"A .... The conditions, again, number one was to attain those sales quotas and to be
honest .... We had those sorts of things, but again, about the only way that you could be
terminated would be if you failed to make your draw for two months in a row....
"Q. Did you tell her any other reasons for which she may be terminated?
"A. Theft or, you know, obviously, murder, or something like that; theft of any company
properties, or so on."
Id. at 274 n.6.
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Unlike Toussaint, plaintiff did not engage in pre-employment negoti-
ations regarding security. She simply "stumbled" into the store one
day and had one interview before being hired. Nor is there any testi-
mony suggesting that plaintiff inquired about job security. Therefore,
Harryman's statements could not have been addressed to any inquiry
regarding job security. In short, no objective evidence exists that their
minds met on the subject of continued employment. In addition, we
note that in Toussaint, the plaintiffs were applying for singular, execu-
tive job positions. That the positions were unique supports the finding
that the terms were specifically negotiated. Here, plaintiff was one of
many departmental salespersons. The fact that plaintiff applied for one
of several identical positions militates against the likelihood that the
contract terms were negotiable and suggests that company policy was
more likely to govern."
Arguments over the continued validity of an employer's power to
dismiss an employee without cause parallel the arguments over the im-
plied warranty of habitability. At one level, attackers and defenders of
the at-will rule appeal to concerns of corrective justice. Those who at-
tack the at-will rule contend that, although it once reflected the typical
employer-employee relationship, the nature of that relationship has
changed, just as the nature of the residential tenancy has changed.45 De-
fenders, in contrast, assert that the at-will rule continues to reflect the
expectations of the parties to the typical employment relationship.46
Proponents and opponents of the at-will rule also appeal to concerns
of distributive justice. Both sides appear to agree that the primary crite-
rion for distributing the power to terminate the employment relationship
is need, but disagree over how to evaluate the relative needs of employers
and employees.
Two primary arguments have been advanced for replacing the at-
will rule, regardless of whether it is a rule of law or construction, with a
rule requiring just cause for dismissal. In many ways these arguments
parallel those made in the warranty of habitability cases. One is based on
the reasonable expectations of the parties. Just as advocates of a war-
ranty of habitability argue that the empirical reality of why people rent
residential property has changed, advocates of requiring just cause for
dismissal contend that the at-will rule is inconsistent with the empirical
reality of the workplace. A second is based on the employee's needs.
44. Id. at 274.
45. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work Employee Policies and Con-
tract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 733.
46. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Effi-
ciency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 306 (3d
ed. 1986).
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Just as advocates of a warranty of habitability contend that residential
tenants need habitable housing, advocates of imposing a just cause stan-
dard for dismissal argue that employees need job security.
A primary argument against requiring just cause for dismissal is
based on employer needs. It is argued that, although employers gener-
ally do not dismiss employees arbitrarily, they need the right to fire at
will because of the transaction costs and proof difficulties that they would
encounter under a just cause standard.
F Corrective Justice and The Parties' Expectations
Professor John Blackburn asserts, "Implying a right to reasonable,
good cause, discharges would serve to reflect the probable intent of the
parties to the employment relationship. '47 Professors Mayer Freed and
Daniel Polsby maintain, "Although buyers and sellers of labor regularly
dicker, at least implicitly, about wages, work assignments, fringe benefits,
working conditions and many other variables, the employer usually
keeps the unilateral power to terminate the employee's job tenure. ' 48
Whose assertions, Blackburn's or Freed and Polsby's, most closely reflect
the empirical reality of the workplace?
The parties' expectations in the employment relationship cannot be
understood in a vacuum. They must be considered in light of the modern
workplace.
The modern workplace has been subject to a barrage of private and
public regulation. The primary source of private regulation has been col-
lective bargaining. Just cause protection is a standard provision of almost
all collective bargaining agreements. The effects of collectively bargained
just cause protection go well beyond the dwindling percentage of Ameri-
can workers covered by such contracts. Many non-unionized employees
were covered by collective bargaining agreements in the past and many
others have worked for employers where at least some portion of the
workforce was covered by collectively bargained just cause protection.
Moreover, supervisors and managers of unionized employees are quite
familiar with the just cause standard because they are forced to live
under it when disciplining their subordinates. The impact of collective
bargaining has gone well beyond unionized bargaining units and has reg-
ularized employment practices generally, regardless of whether the em-
47. John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employ-
ment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 482 (1980).
48. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1989).
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ployer is organized.49
The extensive public regulation of the workplace has also affected
the expectations of employers and employees. The myriad of statutes
and potential common law claims which have precluded bad-cause dis-
charges have stripped the claim that the parties intend the employment
relationship to be terminable at-will of any connection to reality. Indeed,
forceful arguments have been made that the EEO laws alone have im-
posed a de facto just cause limitation on dismissals. 50 Almost ten years
ago, Professor Clyde Summers astutely criticized continued adherence to
the at-will rule, observing, "[T]he underlying principle has long been
dead and the doctrine was but a shell." 51
The available empirical evidence suggests that the intuitive infer-
ences drawn from extensive workplace regulation are correct. Surveys of
employers reveal that nonunionized employers dismiss employees only
for cause and practice progressive discipline almost to the same extent as
exists under collective bargaining agreements.52
The view that a just cause requirement accurately reflects the prob-
able intention of the parties also is consistent with what labor economists
tell us about how employers and workers actually interact. Although
most jobs are short-term, most employment takes place in long-term
jobs. It appears that most employees work in several short-term jobs
before settling into a long-term career with the same employer. This phe-
nomenon reflects the common pattern in unionized and non-unionized
environments, although unionized employees are more likely to find their
career-length jobs sooner than their nonunionized colleagues. 53
Employee compensation also reflects the pattern of most employ-
49. See generally SUMMER H. SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT (1960).
50. Alfred Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection
Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employ-
ment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19-21 (1979).
51. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employment-At- Will Issue:
Introduction 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203 (1983).
52. See BNA Personnel Policies Forum, PPF Survey No. 139 Employee Discipline and Dis-
charge (January 1985) (85% of unionized employers and 79% of nonunionized have written expec-
tations for employees; 94% of unionized and 93% of nonunionized employers require progressive
discipline; 98% of unionized and 99% nonunionized employers require consultation with at least
one other official before a supervisor may suspend or discharge an employee). BNA Personnel Poli-
cies Forum, PPF Survey No. 125, Policies for Unorganized Employees (April 1979) (82% of compa-
nies have written rules of conduct for nonunion employees and 80 percent have complaint
procedures whereby employees may appeal disciplinary action).
53. See, e.g., John T. Addison & Alberto C. Castro, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs: Differ-
ences Between Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 393 (1987); George A.
Akerloff & Brian G. M. Main, An Experience- Weighted Measure of Employment and Unemployment
Durations, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1003 (1981); Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the
U.S. Economy, 72 AM. EON. REV. 716 (1982).
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ment taking place in long-term jobs. A good portion of the employee's
compensation is deferred until later years. Not only does salary increase
with seniority, but fringe benefits often are tied directly to length of ser-
vice, with eligibility for some fringe benefits delayed until completion of a
minimum period of employment.
Economists disagree over how and why compensation increases
with length of service. Some argue that increased compensation reflects
increased productivity which comes with increased tenure. 54 Others con-
tend that employees' compensation does not reflect their marginal prod-
ucts while offering a variety of explanations as to why longer term
employees are paid more than their junior colleagues. 55 The employment
contract as it exists in the labor economist's view of reality is a long term
relational contract. 56
The assumption which underlies the long term relational contract
with deferred compensation is that employment will continue as long as
performance is satisfactory. Limiting dismissal to just cause thus more
accurately reflects the unstated expectations of the parties than does per-
mitting dismissal at will.
The argument that just cause protection reflects the probable intent
of the parties appeals to considerations of corrective justice. If employers
induce employees to work for them, not only with wages and fringe bene-
fits, but also with expectations of job security, an employer who termi-
nates an employee without cause has paid the employee less than called
for by the original bargain. The resulting transactional inequality must
be remedied as a matter of corrective justice.
G. Distributive Justice and The Relative Needs of
Employers and Employees
If a just cause limitation is imposed on employment termination be-
54. See, e.g., James N. Brown, Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the -Job Training and
Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed Within Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 971 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Katherine G. Abraham & James L. Medoff, Length of Service and the Operation of
Internal Labor Markets, PROC. 35TH ANN. MTG., INDUS. REL. RES. ASs'N 308 (1982); Robert H.
Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?, 74 AM. EON. REV. 549 (1984) (suggesting that
the most productive workers in a firm are paid less than their marginal products and the least pro-
ductive are paid more because the highest paid workers also receive compensation in the form of the
status of being the highest paid, while the lowest paid are also compensated for the status penalty
they endure by being the lowest paid); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need For A Just Cause
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1989) (presenting one labor economics theory that workers'
compensation is deferred to police against shirking). See generally Robert M. Hutchens, Seniority,
Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade 3 J. EON. PERSP. 49 (1989) (collecting various
theories).
56. See generally Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. EON. LITERATURE 1144
(1985).
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cause it reflects the probable intent of the parties, the implied covenant to
terminate only for just cause will be waivable. If the parties clearly ex-
press their intent to have a relationship that is terminable at will, no
transactional inequality will result from a termination without cause,57
and principles of corrective justice will not require imposing a require-
ment of just cause. Just as the tenant's needs relative to the landlord's
ability have resulted in some jurisdictions providing that the implied war-
ranty of habitability is not waivable, some have argued that a just cause
standard for discharge is supported by considerations of the employee's
needs and the employer's ability. A consequence of such arguments is
that the just cause standard would not be waivable.
Several employee needs have been advanced to support a non-waiv-
able just cause standard. Most involve the employee's need for the job
itself. The job is a source of income to the employee, but it is also a
source of social status and self-identity.58 Job loss is one of the most
stressful experiences a person can suffer. It often stifles the moral,
mental and material development of the terminated employee and has
severe mental and social consequences for her family as well.5 9 Some
have observed that for many employees, their jobs are the only "prop-
erty" they have and the loss of that property can be devastating. 60
Other arguments focus on the employee's need for just cause protec-
tion, apart from her need for the job itself. Professor Cornelius Peck
argues that the consequences of dismissal on an employee's ability to find
other employment require that the employee have a forum in which to
challenge the cause for the dismissal. If the employer refuses to give the
employee a reason for dismissal, the employee faces a dilemma of falsify-
ing applications for new jobs or telling the truth, leading to the inference
that the employee was terminated for cause. If the employer tells the
employee that she has been dismissed for cause, the employee will be
forced to disclose that fact in searching for a new job, regardless of
whether the reason is mistaken or maliciously motivated.61 Without a
57. A transactional inequality may result from a termination for bad cause, however. See supra
notes 9 and 36-37 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Work in America, Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health,
Education & Welfare (1973).
59. Arguments for greater employee protection based on employee needs have been advanced,
among others, by John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 481 n.64 (1980); and Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed
Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988).
60. See Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BuFF. L. REV. 1081 (1973);
Ruth Weyland, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, in N.Y.U. 22D CONF. ON LABOR 171,
215 (1970).
61. Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4-
6 (1979).
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just cause standard and a forum in which to test her dismissal, the em-
ployee not only has suffered the loss of her employment but has been,
seriously disadvantaged in searching for a new job.
Those who focus on the employee's need for just cause protection
usually argue that the employer has the ability to provide it. They fre-
quently point to employers who already provide just cause protection
under collective bargaining agreements and find that retaining the power
to terminate at will is not necessary to the orderly functioning of the
employer. 62
Thus, the argument for a non-waivable just cause standard for em-
ployee dismissal derives from an evaluation of employee needs and em-
ployer abilities concerning employment termination. It allocates the
power to terminate employment based on the criteria of need and ability.
Thus, it is based in concerns of distributive justice.
Recognizing the distributive nature of the argument for a non-waiv-
able just cause restriction on employment termination enables us to focus
the debate. Such a rule enables distributive justice claims to trump cor-
rective justice claims by mandating just cause for termination when the
parties have expressly bargained for termination at will. For the distribu-
tive concerns to win out, we must be confident that their advocates are
using the proper criteria of merit for the distribution of the power to
terminate and that they have properly applied those criteria. It is on the
latter point that the defenders of the at-will rule take on the just cause
advocates.
Professor Richard Epstein is the leading academic advocate of the
at-will rule. 6 3 He argues that employers need the power to terminate at
will more than employees need just cause protection for job security. He
observes that in the employment relationship, the employer is the sole
claimant of the firm's profits, while the employee is paid a fixed wage.
Consequently, employers face problems of monitoring behavior. Profes-
sor Epstein fears,
In all too many cases, the firm must contend with the recurrent prob-
lem of employee theft and with the related problems of unauthorized
use of firm equipment and employee kickback arrangements .... The
employee on a fixed wage can, at the margin, capture only a portion of
the gain from his labor, and therefore has a tendency to reduce
output.64
62. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 520 (1976).
63. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 947 (1984).
64. Id. at 953.
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The ability to fire at will provides the employer with a much needed form
of social control to resolve the problems that result from the "mismatch
between benefits received and ...labor contributed .. .,,65 Thus, to
protect themselves against willful employee misconduct, employee shirk-
ing and other opportunistic employee behavior, employers need the
power which comes with the ability to discharge at will. Epstein writes:
In order to maintain internal discipline, the firm may have to resort to
sanctions against individual employees. It is far easier to use those
powers that can be unilaterally exercised: to fire, to demote, to with-
hold wages, or to reprimand. These devices can visit very powerful
losses upon individual employees without the need to resort to legal
action, and they permit the firm to monitor employee performance
continually in order to identify both strong and weak workers and to
compensate them accordingly. 66
In Epstein's view, the employee's need for job security is protected
adequately under the at-will rule. First, the employer who discharges
without cause faces substantial reputational losses. Remaining employ-
ees are likely to reevaluate their futures because they will no longer be
assured that good performance will guarantee job security. The best
workers will be the ones most able to change jobs and, therefore, most
likely to leave.
Furthermore, in Epstein's view, the at-will rule enables employees to
diversify their risks of working for poor employers over time. Employee
ability to quit at will enables them to respond when an employer acts in
an arbitrary way. Thus, the at-will relationship is a sensible response on
the part of employer and employee to the problem of imperfect informa-
tion. Each party is able to try the other one out for as long as the rela-
tionship proves to be satisfactory and may leave at any time if the
relationship sours.
It might be argued that a rule requiring cause for termination would
nevertheless satisfy the employer's legitimate needs to control employee
opportunistic behavior. Professor Epstein responds that the at-will rule
is superior because it avoids the administrative costs involved in litigating
the merits of the employer's reasons for termination. In his view, be-
cause the reputational disadvantages already adequately protect the em-
ployee from opportunistic employer behavior, employers' needs for
protection from employee advantage-taking outweigh those of employ-
ees. He elaborates:
The chances of finding an innocent employee wronged by a firm yen-
65. Id. at 964.
66. Id. at 965.
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detta are quite remote. By the same token, jury sympathy with ag-
grieved plaintiffs may result in a very large number of erroneous
verdicts for employees. In principle it might be proper to tolerate the
high error rate if the consequences of erroneous dismissal to the inno-
cent employee were more severe than the consequences of erroneous
reinstatement to the innocent employer. But quite the opposite is apt
to be the case. Able employees are the very persons who have the
greatest opportunity of obtaining alternate employment in the market-
place and who can therefore best mitigate their losses. 67
Professor Epstein's view of the relative needs of employers and em-
ployees appears to underlie the continued judicial adherence to the at-
will rule in contract. Courts which adhere to at-will termination as a
rule of law express concern that deviations will interfere with the em-
ployer's ability to manage the enterprise.68 Courts which, although re-
casting the at-will rule as a rule of construction, place a heavy burden on
the employee to rebut the presumption of at-will employment similarly
express concern for the employer's needs in managing the workforce.
They recognize that when employees are hired, both parties express ex-
pectations of a long-term mutually satisfactory relationship, but refuse to
give contractual effect to those expectations out of fear of impeding the
employer's ability to manage the workforce.69
These distributive concerns with the employer's relatively greater
need for power in the workplace go a long way to explaining the other-
wise incomprehensible ways in which the Rowe court distinguished Tous-
saint. The court held that statements by Rowe's manager that she would
have a job as long as she sold enough appliances to meet her draw against
commissions did not establish a promise of job security, even though it
had previously held that statements to Toussaint, that he would have a
position as long as he performed his job, did. The court reasoned that
unlike Toussaint, Rowe did not negotiate for job security and that unlike
Toussaint, who occupied a unique executive position, Rowe was one of
many sales representatives. Thus, in Rowe the court was very sensitive to
the employer's needs to control the behavior of its mass workforce, needs
that were not as strong with employees occupying unique executive
positions.
The modern employment relationship is a long term relational con-
67. Id. at 970.
68. "There must be protection from substantial impairment of the very legitimate interests of
an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel available or the very foundation of
the free enterprise system could be jeopardized." Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395,
396 (Tenn. App. 1981).
69. See, e.g., Broussard v. Caci Inc.-Fed., 780 F.2d 162, 163 (1st Cir. 1986); Rowe v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. Inc., 473 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Mich. 1991).
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tract replete with express and implied promises of job security. As a
matter of corrective justice, courts should give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the parties and require just cause for dismissal. Instead,
courts use the at-will rule in contract to distribute workplace power
based on the mediated criteria of employer and employee needs for such
power, and rely on these distributive concerns to trump the corrective
justice claims of employees. The courts' underlying evaluation of the rel-
ative needs of the parties is highly problematic.
Defenders of the at-will rule contend that the rule efficiently medi-
ates the distribution of power in the workplace between employers and
employees; i.e. that power cannot be redistributed without making at
least one of the two groups worse off. They premise this on the preva-
lence of at-will employment in the nonunionized private sector. They
reject arguments that enforceable promises of job security may actually
improve productivity by reducing turnover and encouraging cooperation
among employees. For example, Judge Richard Posner asks, "why if
grievance machinery and job security reduce costly turnover and en-
hance worker efficiency, employers do not adopt these devices without
waiting for a union to come on the scene."'70
The short answer to Judge Posner and others is that employers do
adopt these devices without waiting for unions to come on the scene.
Most employers follow policies of disciplining and discharging only for
cause, follow progressive disciplinary systems and provide internal proce-
dures for employees to appeal disciplinary actions. 71 The primary differ-
ence between job security in unionized and nonunionized employment is
that it is only in the former that promises of job security are legally en-
forceable. Indeed, the general prevalence of job security devices in nonu-
nionized workplaces substantially undermines the contention that the at-
will rule efficiently allocates workplace power between employers and
employees.
The view that employers need power to terminate at will more than
employees need just cause protection overemphasizes non-legal deter-
rents to wrongful dismissal. The deferral of much employee compensa-
tion provides employers with a major incentive to engage in
opportunistic behavior because senior employees receiving high salaries
and many fringe benefits may be replaced by much cheaper new hires.
Even where the senior employee is performing satisfactorily, the em-
ployer may conclude that the money saved by replacing her with a
70. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306 (3d ed. 1986).
71. See supra note 52.
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cheaper new hire outweighs the risk that the new hire will not perform as
well.
The negative reputational effects of dismissal without cause are not
likely to deter employer opportunistic behavior. The likelihood that un-
just dismissals will induce the employees who remain to quit is small.
Those employees' investments in firm-specific human capital, coupled
with the general practice of deferring employee compensation, make it
very unlikely that they will be able to obtain as much compensation in
the marketplace as they are receiving from their current employer.
Moreover, the employer undoubtedly will portray the dismissal as justi-
fied. Remaining employees are not likely to have sufficient information
to determine whether the dismissal was justified. Instead of quitting, cur-
rent employees are far more likely to react to a controversial dismissal by
hoping that their employer is right, or if their employer is wrong, hoping
that the same thing will not happen to them.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that negative reputational effects of
unjust dismissals will deter potential new hires from working for the em-
ployer. Unfortunately, the deterrent effect is undermined by the absence
of information in the marketplace. Indeed, employer personnel prac-
tices, such as deferring compensation and assuring prospective employees
of fair treatment and a bright future, lead employees to believe that they
have just cause protection or will never need it. Even when such prac-
tices are absent, there is little opportunity to obtain information about
the employer's record in dismissing employees. There is no Consumers
Reports rating employer dismissal practices. Indeed, concern over lack
of information about terminations led the Federal Trade Commission to
require franchisors to provide such data to prospective franchisees. 72
Prospective employees have no similar rule to protect them. One com-
mentator has observed that when employees are unionized, they have
greater access to information and consequently, almost invariably, they
demand and receive just cause protection. 73
Defenders of the at-will rule not only overstate the deterrents to un-
just dismissals, they understate the negative effects of unjust dismissal on
the employee. It is far easier for a wrongfully discharged employee to
obtain comparable other employment in the fertile imagination of Profes-
sor Epstein than it is in reality. First, the likelihood of unjust dismissal is
greatest in periods of high unemployment. During such times, the mar-
72. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1.
73. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
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ket contains many qualified employees, thereby reducing the risks to the
employer of replacing a satisfactory senior employee with a cheaper new
hire of unknown ability. Thus, the wrongfully discharged employee may
find alternative opportunities to be few and far between.
Even if there are jobs available, the odds are against the wrongfully
discharged employee obtaining one. Because employers face the same
problem of inadequate information in evaluating potential new hires as
employees face in evaluating potential new jobs, an employer is likely to
regard a dismissal, even when the employee maintains it was a wrongful
dismissal, as a negative in evaluating an applicant. Finally, if the em-
ployee defies the odds and obtains comparable other employment, she
still will have suffered considerable harm. In her new job, she will start
from scratch. She will have lost the higher salary, ability to accrue pen-
sion, vacation and other fringe benefits, and, in many cases, protection
against reductions in force that came with her seniority in her former job.
Thus, employee needs for just cause protection are far greater than
envisioned by defenders of the at-will rule. Moreover, employer needs
for the power to terminate without cause are far less than suggested by
at-will rule advocates.
Employers do need disciplinary tools to ensure that employees re-
frain from shirking their duties or other types of employee opportunistic
behavior. The power to terminate without cause, however, is not one of
those tools. Indeed, employers generally induce their employees to be-
lieve that all discipline and dismissals will be for cause. Even Professor
Epstein argues that concern for their reputations will lead almost all em-
ployers to discharge only for cause, even though the law does not impose
such limitations. Thus, it is not the threat of unfair dismissal that deters
employee opportunistic behavior; it is the threat of discipline or dis-
charge for cause that employers rely on to deter such misconduct.
The other source of employer need is the need to avoid the adminis-
trative costs of having to defend a dismissal in litigation and the risk of a
factually inaccurate outcome in the litigation. For purposes of analysis,
we may disregard the bias which seethes from Professor Epstein's unsub-
stantiated assertion that employers rarely dismiss employees unjustly but
employees frequently sue to contest justified dismissals. Even assuming a
substantial likelihood that factfinders reviewing employer dismissals will
make mistakes, the costs to employers are greatly exaggerated.
There have been several studies of employees reinstated by arbitra-
tors pursuant to the just cause provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments. These studies survey the employers years after reinstatement.
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They find that most employees who actually return to their jobs remain
on the job and, in the view of their employers, make satisfactory progress
on the job. Despite these employees' satisfactory post-reinstatement pro-
gress, their employers maintain in most cases that they still believe that
the dismissals were just and that the arbitrator erred in ordering rein-
statement. 74 Thus, even if we assume that the factfinder reached the
wrong result in every case, the negative consequences to the employer
have been minimal.75
In conclusion, courts that continue to cling to the at-will rule, either
as a rule of law or a rule of construction, are relying on distributive con-
cerns of employer and employee needs that are faulty to override correc-
tive justice concerns of giving effect to the parties' reasonable
expectations. Such action is inappropriate. To rectify the situation,
courts should give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties to
the employment relationship and presume that contracts of indefinite
employment are terminable only for just cause.
III. CONCLUSION
As the title indicates, this paper presents some preliminary thoughts
on the corrective and distributive justice concerns in. the debate over em-
ployment at-will. These thoughts may be summarized as follows.
Control over employment termination is a major determinant of
workplace power. The debate over employment at-will focuses on the
appropriate approach to the legal regulation of this power. The tort of
retaliatory discharge contrary to public policy is a judicial exercise in
distributive justice, whereby courts distribute power in the workplace ac-
cording to the mediating criteria of employer need and social utility of
employee conduct. Bipolar litigation, however, is a forum that is not
well suited to evaluate the social utility of immunizing particular em-
ployee conduct from employer control over job security. The distributive
74. See, e.g., Chalmer E. Labig et al., Discipline History, Seniority and Reasons for Discharge as
Predictors of Post-Reinstatement Job Performance, 40 ARB. J. 44 (Sept. 1985); Arthur A. Malinow-
ski, An Empirical Analysis of Discharge Cases and the Work History of Employees Reinstated by
Labor Arbitrators, 36 ARB. J. 31 (Mar. 1981); Thomas J. McDermott & Thomas H. Newhams,
Discharge Reinstatement: What Happens Thereafter, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 526 (1971); Ar-
thur Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases. What Happens After Reinstatement, 10 N.A.A. PROC.
35 (1957).
75. Although the studies reached inconsistent results concerning some factors, such as senior-
ity, as predictors of successful post reinstatement performance, they generally agree that employees
discharged for absenteeism have a strong likelihood of poor performance following reinstatement.
Absenteeism, however, is probably the employee performance deficiency that is easiest to document.
The transaction costs in establishing absenteeism as a dischargeable offense are likely to be lower
than the transaction costs for other offenses.
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justice issues involved in balancing employer need against social utility
are best left to the legislature.
Corrective justice concerns, however, call for limitations on em-
ployer power to discharge to protect the reasonable expectations of the
parties. The tort of abusive discharge, as originally advocated by Law-
rence Blades, protects employees from discharge for reasons that are not
legitimately related to the employer's business. As such, the tort seeks to
redress transactional moral wrongs in accordance with corrective justice
principles and has been improperly overlooked by the courts in favor of
the public policy-based retaliatory discharge tort.
The empirical reality of the modern workplace is marked by long-
term employment relationships in which compensation increases with job
tenure. The working assumption of these long-term relational contracts
is that employees shall not be discharged except for just cause. Consider-
ations of corrective justice require that the law give effect to the probable
intention of the parties and presume that employment contracts are ter-
minable only for just cause.
Courts have uniformly adhered to the at-will rule in contract law,
either as an absolute rule of law or as a very strong presumption in con-
tract interpretation. In so doing, these courts are redistributing power in
the workplace from employees to employers based on the mediating cri-
teria of employer and employee need. The redistribution is inappropriate
as it generally understates the employee's need for job security and over-
states the employer's need for power to fire at-will. Advocates of a
mandatory just cause standard, on the other hand, view employee needs
as substantially outweighing employer needs regarding job termination.
Although the distributive justice claims for retaining the at-will rule
overstate employer needs and understate employee needs, they do pro-
vide reason to question whether the balance of needs is so tilted toward
employees to mandate just cause protection even when the parties have
expressly bargained for an at-will relationship. Before mandating just
cause protection, rather than presuming it and allowing parties to ex-
pressly contract around the presumption, we should carefully evaluate
the distributive criteria to determine whether we can generalize as to the
relative needs of employers and employees for all or at least most control
over employment termination.
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